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A Modified Delphi Methodology to Conduct an
Failure Modes Effects Analysis:
A Patient-Centric Effort in a Clinical
Medical Laboratory
[AQ1]

Peter B. Southard; Sameer Kumar; Cheryl A. Southard, MT, ASCP
In this article, we describe the use of an
information-gathering tool, the Delphi technique, to
overcome issues encountered when conducting a
Failure Modes Effects Analysis as part of a Define,
Measure, Analyze, Implement, Control study to
improve the processes of a clinical medical
laboratory. The study was conducted with the goals
of reducing medical errors in the total testing
process to improve patient safety, patient
satisfaction, and improve the overall quality of the
health care services provided by the subject hospital
while meeting its Joint Commission accreditation
requirements. The study found that the Delphi
technique was very useful in overcoming 4 barriers
encountered in conducting a Failure Modes Effects
Analysis in a hospital’s clinical medical laboratory
and in achieving those goals.

“T

hings happen. . .[we] can’t be perfect” is a recent quote from a clinical laboratory worker in a hospital
when asked on a survey why the
critical results of patient’s tests may not be properly reported. Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon issue in providing quality patient care in today’s
highly competitive, highly cost-conscious health care
systems. “Laboratory processes are designed on the
premise that nothing will go wrong.”1(p32) The importance and relevance of laboratory processes in
improving the quality of clinical outcomes was emphasized by Dock when she stated that “70% of all
information used by a clinician to diagnose and treat [AQ3]
a patient comes from the laboratory.”(p210)
The concepts of developing and implementing formalized approaches to providing quality products
and services to customers are generally credited to the
Toyota Motor Company beginning in the 1950s and
continuing to today. So successful were those quality and continuous improvement methodologies in
manufacturing that American companies sent teams
to Japan to learn about them. Major US corporations
understood the value of those tools and methodologies and, in typical American fashion, formalized
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them even further. In the 1980s, Motorola developed
what it christened “Six Sigma,” which Jack Welch
and GE later brought to the public’s attention through
their “Black Belt” and “CI” (continuous improvement) quality programs. The gains in customer satisfaction, and in financial measures, created by these efforts were undeniable. Other industries besides manufacturing began to take notice.
The health care industry has looked at the issues
of quality from a more clinical setting. Quality problems in health care cannot simply be “scrapped” or
“reworked” as they can in manufacturing. Quality issues in health care can often jeopardize patient safety
and lead to serious injury and death. When the nearly
300-page report “To err is human: Building a safer
health system” was published by the committee on
health care in America in 1999 citing the high number of serious medical errors that occur on a daily
basis in the United States, it began a fresh movement
towards improving quality in today’s health care systems. That same year, the national accrediting body
for hospitals and other health care organizations, the
Joint Commission (JC), issued its own revised mission
statement which included the goal “to continuously
improve the safety and quality of care provided to the
public through the provision of health care accreditation and related services that support performance
improvement in health care organizations.” The JC
put standards into place that required accredited hospitals to provide evidence that at least 1 performance
improvement initiative was implemented annually.
More than 10 years later, however, many health care
systems are still struggling with the issues raised by
that report, and with meeting the standards set by the
JC, namely, that of determining the causes of medical errors and putting into place the systems that
will prevent those errors from occurring. These struggles are created by a number of factors facing health
care including how to juxtapose patient safety and
care with the unique balance of clinical and business
needs that managing a health care system requires,
the broad range of skill levels of the workers involved,
the problems of scheduling administrative priorities
around critical care and clinical priorities, the 3- or
4-shift, 24-hour, 7-day-a-week working environment,

and the multiple interfaces required between a complex set of functional areas.
One methodology recognized by the JC, and designed to provide a framework by which to address such issues of quality in complex systems, is
the Define, Measure, Analyze, Improve, and Control
(DMAIC) steps used to implement the Six Sigma quality systems mentioned earlier. This article followed
those steps in improving the processes of a clinical medical laboratory but, in doing so, determined
that the traditional methods the Failure Mode Effects
Analysis (FMEA) tool of DMAIC could, in and of itself, use improvement.
Specifically, this article evaluated the use of a structured communication process, known as the Delphi technique, to facilitate the implementation of
FMEA, a performance improvement tool of the Analyze phase of DMAIC, in the clinical laboratory environment of one of those health care systems. Although the use of FMEA in a health care setting is not,
in and of itself, unique, the use of FMEA as applied
to the total testing process (TTP) of a clinical laboratory setting has not yet been well-documented nor has
the Delphi technique approach taken by this project
been used to date. This modified process will allow
complex health care systems to more readily implement quality tools that improve patient safety, patient
care, and patient satisfaction, the ultimate goal of the
improvement. The second goal of the project was to
assist the subject hospital in meeting its JC requirements of implementing a continuous improvement
initiative.

RELATED WORK
Related work in this area appears to fall into the
areas of the extent and sources of errors, determining
which errors are most critical to address, and methods of preventing those errors.
As patient, or customer, satisfaction is of prime
concern in the competitive environment of health
care, it is crucial to understand what patients think.
Surveys report that overall perceived level of medical safety being rated as excellent by only 48% of
surveyed patients, 10% of patients noted they had
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concerns that the “wrong” test would be conducted
on them and 6% were afraid of being mistaken for
another patient.2
Economic costs of laboratory error can be used to
prioritize quality efforts but differ with the laboratory
test. Probable costs per error can be used to identify
tests with the highest costs to patients. These costper-error-data, when combined with test volume data
and error rates by test, can help point to the tests
that should receive priority in a laboratory improvement program.3 Fundamental performance measures,
as the next step in aligning and maximizing laboratory improvement efforts, include customer satisfaction, turnaround times, patient identification, specimen acceptability, proficiency testing, critical value
reporting, blood product wastage, and blood culture
contamination.4 The surgical specialties, emergency
rooms, and intensive care units have been previously
identified as areas of risk for patient safety. Appropriate attention to system factors involved in these errors
and designing system approaches help to control and
eliminate many of the errors.5
Various tools and techniques have been employed
to reduce medical errors. Implemented bar codebased positive patient identification system is used
in inpatient phlebotomy. In addition, bar code technology significantly reduced the rate of specimen
identification errors.6 Laboratories actively engaged
in ongoing specimen labeling quality monitors had
fewer specimen labeling errors. Establishing quality
metrics for specimen labeling and deploying 24/7phlebotomy operations may contribute to improving
the accuracy of specimen labeling for the clinical
laboratory.7
Two complementary strategies that appear to be associated with reduction of errors have been identified. The first strategy involves doing what is necessary to prevent the occurrence of errors in the first
place. Health care workers must be properly educated
to perform tasks with as few errors as possible. There
should be written policies detailing responsibilities.
The second strategy involves the assumption that errors will occur anyway. It is essential that systems
designed to eliminate errors include elements of redundancy to catch those mistakes.8

3

Participating hospitals found that the Statistical
Process Control spreadsheet is very suitable to monitor the performance of the sample labeling and collection and applied statistical process control charts
to suit their specific needs. Statistical process control
could be applied to other critical steps in the transfusion processes as a tool for biovigilance and could
be used to develop regional or national performance
standards for pretransfusion sample collection.9 Despite a mixture of both skepticism and enthusiasm
in applying Six-Sigma methods into clinical laboratories, a systematic Six-Sigma approach in clinical
microbiology, and other departments of laboratories,
were able to improve the quality of the processes
there.10
Several software applications are currently available that can aid error reduction in clinical chemistry.
Both laboratory consultants and the use of information and communication technology are tools in optimizing the efficiency of laboratory medicine.11
Quality management programs could be developed
and improved not only looking at human error causation factor but also at human behavior that enhances
system performance and other factors that affect adverse events specifically by understanding team coordination tasks that strongly affect patient care and
quality management, and also how the adverse events
dynamics affects provider tasks and constrains.12 In
addition, different modeling techniques, specifically
discrete event simulation of system process and modeling, could be used to improve emergency services
and resolve negative impact of long waiting time, thus
enhancing quality of the services.13
As this study focused on the clinical laboratory process, it was necessary to define the set of processes
involved. The set selected was based on the TTP described by McCay et al,14 which divides the steps into
3 phases, preanalytical, analytical, and postanalytical. As demonstrated by previous research, the pre
and postanalytical steps still have the highest error
prevalence; however, changes occurred in the types
and frequencies of errors in the phases of testing.15
To improve patient safety in laboratory medicine, the
focus should be on the pre- and postanalytic phases,
and the concept of patient safety as a multisystem
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concept must be better understood.14 The World
Alliance for Patient Safety supports improvement
of patient safety globally and provides a potential
framework for considering the total testing process.14
Patient misidentification and problems in communicating results are recognized as the main goals for
quality improvement. Each practice must examine its
own total testing process to understand weaknesses
and remedies.16
Preanalytic workstations are also an important tool
for reducing errors. For example, the “San Bassiano
hospital” experience illustrates the combination of
strategic thinking, management planning, advanced
information technology, and robotics which led to
more reliable specimen collection and preanalytical
sample handling and enhanced clinical efficiency as
an integral part of the laboratory process. Errors in
the total testing process thus were almost completely
eliminated.17
The FMEA tool has specifically been identified in
previous studies as an excellent tool for preventing
medical errors from occurring. The FMEA is a technique for error detection and reduction. It was introduced within the aerospace industry in the 1960s.
The FMEA may become the common standard for
measurement and comparison, particularly in laboratory medicine. For example, a significant reduction
of the risk priority number was obtained when applying the FMEA to blood cross-matching, to clinical chemistry analytes, and to point-of-care testing.18
The FMEA quantifies design or process risk, so high
risk can be easily identified.19 In addition, it is a useful tool for not only risk identification but also for
injury prevention.20
The use of FMEA in health care has been recommended by organizations such as the Institute
for Safe Medication Practices, American Society of
Health-System Pharmacists, and The JC.21 It has only
relatively recently been adapted to health care, but
the impact has been tremendous. New processes,
procedures, and care delivery methods are being
“tested” to see whether there are weaknesses that
could reach a patient and cause harm.22 In one use
in a Children’s Hospital in Minnesota, the use of
FMEA resulted in a 75% decrease in the number of

mislabeled or unlabeled specimens received in the
laboratory.23 The FMEA method has achieved lasting
benefits in various industries but remains untested in
acute care hospitals according to some researchers.24
The FMEA process includes the following elements:
choose, assemble, organize, conduct, and develop.25
The FMEA focuses on processes that manufacture
products and involves the calculation of a risk priority number through a 3-variable equation where
each variable is scored from 1 to 10. Medical device
manufacturers have used this process when evaluating their equipment.26 Complete review of a clinical process using FMEA requires the commitment
of significant resources, but it is likely to result in
valuable return on investments.27 Latino notes that
using FMEA in health care promotes both improved
patient safety and reduces adverse outcomes which
have multiple benefits to the system employing it.28
The FMEA provides that proactive approach to provide both improved patient safety and improved clinical outcomes.1
The prior research indicated that both DMAIC and
its related tool FMEA have been used successfully
in the medical area to reduce medical errors and improve patient safety and satisfaction but its application in the TTP was not as well-documented but is
very much needed.29 The current research project
determined some possible reasons why this had
occurred.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM—
BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND
RESEARCH QUESTION
The current study began as an exercise in process
improvement using the traditional business process
improvement methodology of DMAIC. This improvement was desired by the staff and management of a
clinical medical laboratory operating in a mediumsized rural hospital in the Midwest. In the Define
phase of DMAIC, the study reviewed the processes
involved and the significance of the problems in the
clinical medical laboratory. The objectives defined
were to reduce the numbers of different medical errors occurring in those processes to improve patient
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adapted from McCay, et.al., 2009

Figure 1. Total testing process steps.

safety and satisfaction as well as reducing overall
costs for the hospital. Measurements would consist
of the numbers of those various errors but to define
those errors would first require their identification by
the employees involved in the processes.
As mentioned earlier, the FMEA is considered one
of the tools of the Six Sigma quality toolkit. While
originally developed by the US Military right after
WWII, the FMEA was also adopted by the developers of the Six Sigma methodology as a tool to assist in multiple phases of the DMAIC methodology.
It was most often employed in the Analyze and Improve phases to understand problem areas and to develop policies and procedures to prevent potential
errors from occurring. As this study began the Analyze phase of DMAIC, the FMEA was selected to
help identify both areas of the process needing improvements as well as the actions, or Improvements,
to those processes.
Several steps are involved in a traditional FMEA,
the first of which is to define the topic and select a specific process to study. The general area selected, that
of the clinical medical laboratory, was established in
the Define phase earlier. The specific process, or set

of tasks, selected, was that of the TTP14 of the clinical
medical laboratory. The TTP involves 3 major phases;
preanalytical, analytical, and postanalytical. Within
each major phase of the TTP are several steps, which
are illustrated in Figure 1.
The steps of the analytical phase generally occur
exclusively within the laboratory and are performed
by laboratory personnel (technicians and technologists) whereas the steps of the pre- and postphases
generally occur outside the boundaries of the laboratory and involve hospital employees and providers
besides laboratory technologists. The crossfunctionality of the tasks increases the complexity
of the FMEA process and leads to the second step.
The second step in completing an FMEA is the selection of the multidisciplinary team to complete the
process. The third step in the FMEA process involves
conducting the hazard analysis in which points of
failure within the process are identified, their causes,
severity, and probability documented, and a hazard
score calculated. Fourth, actions are developed to
prevent the errors from occurring and, finally, measures are put in place to monitor the success of the
action implementation. As the second step of the
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FMEA began, certain issues immediately became apparent.
As mentioned, a traditional FMEA is completed
by a multidisciplinary set of process owners in a
team/group setting that allows for both brainstorming
and group consensus to take place. The health care
setting, however, presents unique challenges to this
traditional methodology due to those factors mentioned earlier. Those factors included how to maintain high levels of patient safety and care while balancing the clinical and business needs of managing a
health care system, the broad range of skill and education levels of the workers involved, the problems in
scheduling administrative priorities around critical
care and various clinical priorities, the 3- to 4-shift,
24-hour, 7 day-a-week working environment, and the
multiple interfaces required between disparate complex sets of functional areas. These factors create a
4-way barrier to the group creation process required
by FMEA:
1. Vertically: Personnel involved in the TTP
process come from varying levels of authority
(and skill/education levels) within the hospital environment from pathologists (medical
doctors—who may also be hospital administrators), to phlebotomists (whose sole task is
drawing blood specimens), to line staff with
minimal formal training. This creates both difficulties in physically assembling a team as well
as the possibility that lower level employees
will feel intimidated discussing failure modes
that may be attributable to higher level staff (eg,
doctors) in a group setting that also includes
those staff members.
2. Horizontally: The TTP process spans the boundaries of many functional areas including not
only departments within the laboratory but also
other various hospital departments including
nursing, emergency, neonatal care, obstetrics,
clinics, radiology, and many others depending on the tests needed. Again, this presents
challenges in assembling & coordinating team
activities.
3. Temporally: As the hospital operates in a
24-hour, 7-day-a-week mode, several different

shifts of employees are required with little crossshift time available to allow full representation
and participation.
4. Clinical criticality: Because of the nature of
the business involved, patients’ clinical needs
trump any administrative duties or requests
such as team meetings.
Combining these 4 factors, it becomes nearly impossible to assemble a dedicated cross-functional
team of process owners that can meet in one place
at one time for any length of time. Because of this
4-way group-forming barrier, a regular FMEA team
that included any kind of viable representation was
nearly impossible to accomplish for this process.
The research question then became:
How could the traditional FMEA steps be modified to facilitate accessing the combined knowledge base of process owners needed for accomplishing the intended goals of identifying
potential medical errors, creating a ranked hazard score for them, developing policies, procedures and mechanisms to prevent their occurrence, implementing those policies, procedures
and mechanisms and then controlling their use
for sustainability with the final objective of improving patient safety, care, and satisfaction?
A unique approach was developed, using a surveybased Delphi-technique methodology, to answer that
question and achieve that objective.

DELPHI TECHNIQUE
The Delphi technique has been defined as “. . .a
method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a group
of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex
problem.”30(p3) Its application in health care research
has been documented by de Meyrick31(p14) who noted
that it is “well-suited to health care research,” that it
is flexible, so there is “no need for the respondents
to be available all at the same time,”31 and that its
anonymity “removes many of the other weaknesses of
other research methods.”(p15) Mullen determined that
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the Delphi technique can be used in lieu of the meeting format to avoid the problems caused by the vertical issues mentioned earlier.32 She also mentioned it
had “enormous potential in many areas of health services research and practice”32(p49) . Loo33 also stresses
its strategic importance as well as emphasizing the
need for correct design in research adding that
doing so yields a powerful information-gathering
tool.
The research indicated that this tool could prove
very useful in overcoming all 4 of the barriers encountered. To apply the technique, a set of 12 “FMEA
Process Steps” was created for its application in this
study. These process steps are illustrated in Figure 2.

ANALYZE PHASE—CONDUCTING AN
FMEA USING THE DELPHI TECHNIQUE
The FMEA process steps 1 through 3 were described earlier as they constituted the rationale behind the development of the new process. The institution under study was a small rural hospital in the
Midwest of the United States. The next step, FMEA
process step 4, involved selecting and coordinating
with the hospital and laboratory contacts. Once this
was accomplished, a survey was developed to allow
individuals across the 4 factors, mentioned earlier,
to contribute ideas as to where and what errors occurred in the TTP, as well as to the sources, probabilities and severity of each. Open-ended questions
were used asking respondents to identify and describe what kinds of errors could occur at each step
of the TTP as well as possible causes of those errors
and the severity and probability of each. The definitions for probability and severity were adapted from
those used by the Veterans Administration for their
health care Failure Mode and Effect Analyses program. A description of the definitions (errors, causes,
TTP step boundaries, probability, and severity) was
provided in the survey itself.
In the FMEA process step 5, surveys were distributed to all laboratory employees as well as several
individual outside the laboratory including nurses
and hospital administrators. Verbal instructions were

7

provided by either the laboratory technical supervisor (LTS) or the hospital performance improvement clinical evaluator or both. A total of 15 surveys
were received back from a cross-section of employees
in different departments and shifts including technologists (both laboratory technologists [CLS/MT—
generally 4-year degree] and laboratory technicians
[CLT/MLT—generally 2-year degree]), nurses, administrators, and staff personnel.
Following the completion of the initial survey, the
FMEA process step 6 was analysis and summarization of the information including the creation of a
master list of errors and hazard scores. Hazard scores
are rankings based on the severity and probability of
an error occurring. The higher the hazard score, the
more critical the effect of the error. The study used
hazard scores as described by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs. The table and associated
values may be seen in Table A of the Appendix. The
top 20% of errors as ranked by hazard score, plus any
errors whose severity was ranked as catastrophic but
were not in the top 20%, were placed on a second survey. As part of the analysis, the top 20% were ranked
based on the step in the TTP. It was noted that the
majority of that top percentage of critical errors identified were generated in TTP step 11 Reporting, TTP
step 4 Patient/Specimen Identification, and TTP step
9 Specimen Analysis (in that order). This ranking of
error frequencies may be seen in Figure 3.
This analysis helped to identify which errors, and
steps, would be good candidates for improvement efforts both now and in the future.
The second survey was then redistributed in the
FMEA process step 7 (refer to Figure 2) with 2 goals:
(1) validate the initial consolidated hazard scores and
(2) request participants to individually brainstorm to
identify actions that would prevent the listed errors
from occurring. Participants were instructed not to
be concerned about the cost or feasibility of any recommended action, but to list any and all actions they
felt could prevent the error. That second set of surveys was collected and analyzed in step 8. From this
step, a master list of errors and their suggested possible preventative actions was created. A summary of
that list is shown in Table 1.
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Figure 2. The Failure Mode And Effect Analysis process steps for a clinical medical laboratory using a modified Delphi technique.

Recognizing that the hospital has limited resources
in terms of personnel, time, and funding, only the
most critical errors, as determined by their hazard
scores, were considered. The table, therefore, only
includes those errors with the highest identified score
of 12. The full table can be seen in the Appendix as
Table B.

On the basis of the revised validated hazard scores,
preventive actions for the most critical errors were selected for implementation in the FMEA process step
9. This step was performed based on inputs and participation of the laboratory technical supervisor and
the hospital risk manager. Of these, the hospital contacts helped to determine which alternatives would
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Figure 3. Error frequency by total testing process steps.

provide the most feasible and most effective preventative actions that would help to improve both patient
safety and patient satisfaction.

IMPROVE/IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
The Improvement phase of DMAIC includes determining appropriate actions needed to correct process deficiencies and implementing those corrections. The plan for implementing the selected actions,
the FMEA process step 9, initially involved presenting the proposed actions to the hospital contacts and
then to administration for approval and selection of
actions for implementation. This selection process
was based on 2 criteria: both the hazard score of the
identified error (the higher the hazard score the more
critical the need for an error-proofed task) and the
probability of success of implementing the action.
It was believed that a successful implementation to
prove the effectiveness of the process was as important as the criticality of the action.
The resulting selection focused on the fourth error from Table 1, “phlebotomist drawing blood from
patient with no wristband.” An implementation and
control plan was then developed. It was determined
to develop a 2-phase implementation. In phase 1, the
Performance Improvement Clinical Evaluator and the
Laboratory Technical Supervisor, will initiate an audit for 2 weeks beginning approximately February 14,
2011. The audits will consist of laboratory employ-

9

ees monitoring the patients that they encounter for
appropriate wristbands. These employees will be selected by both the LTS and the laboratory manager.
This monitoring would be unannounced and performed on a random daily basis. During this audit,
deviations from the current policy of wrist-banding
will be noted including who, when, and why. Laboratory personnel would have spare bands with them
and, if an unbanded patient is found, the error can be
immediately corrected in the course of the audit.
Using the data from this audit, the LTS and the laboratory manager will make a decision as to whether
enforcing the current policy (through reeducation) is
sufficient or whether the hospital needs to develop
new policies. New policies would be the responsibility of the LTS and would be put in place approximately 2 weeks following the decision.
Once that decision is made by the LTS and the laboratory manager, phase 2 is a 1-month follow-up audit
immediately following the issuance of the new policy (or reeducation of existing). If no problems exist
during time, spot audits will be conducted on a quarterly basis. If problems resurface, LTS and laboratory
manager will readdress and correct and audit again
in a cyclical manner. This plan was summarized in
table format as seen in Table 2.
The LTS and the Performance Improvement Clinical Evaluator are also planning a secondary auditing
round, following the completion of the primary implementation, to confirm the use of 2-patient identifier use (eg, wristband and patient’s statement of
name, date of birth). This was an added benefit of
the Delphi-enabled FMEA in that it reinforced process improvement efforts already underway.

CONTROL PHASE
One primary objective of DMAIC is to set into place
proper Controls (per the last phase of the DMAIC)
such that policies, procedures, and practices do not
lapse back into preimplementation habits. This is the
FMEA process step 10. One important aspect of this
is the feedback loops associated with each of the steps
in the process. A critical concept of DMAIC is that it
is never a “one-time” shot at improvement but rather
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Table 1
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS
AND CLERICAL STAFF (MOST CRITICAL)
Hazard
Score

Error

Possible Action to Prevent

12

Critical value not reported, lost
report from floor to provider

12

Nurse interprets report &
decides caregiver
notifications can wait.

12

Provider misunderstands
results or implications of
results—orders or fails to
order additional testing and/
or procedures

12

Phlebotomist drawing blood
from patient with no
wristband
Incorrect results reported in
step 10

Be sure there is adequate staff and that they are paying attention.
Monitor/audit to identify where errors are occurring and provide more
education.
Document errors on employee file.
Call provider no matter what.
Call laboratory or just reprint if lost.
Provide a screen, similar to the laboratory, they cannot “WIZ” past and
emphasize how important this could be.
Educate the nurses that it is not nurse’s decision and that it is provider’s
responsibility to accept these calls.
Have a physician on call available from PM through A M (when doctors are
in office/floors) to be point of contact in case provider of patient
unavailable.
Keep log of critical calls received and attempt communication with
patient’s provider.
Reassess policy for review.
Design a better “on-call” list for laboratory result notifications. For patient
type A: call X, for patient type B: call Y.
Have a better process established through quality control officer.
Improve communication between pathologist, laboratory, and providers.
Provide continuing education as well as additional information or classes.
Have additional support available for consultation.
Schedule more frequent “Lunch & Learn” sessions between providers and
the pathologist (or pathology practice).
Provide education from laboratory pathologist on new tests or technology.
Educate providers that they need to call the laboratory for interpretation if
necessary.
Do not draw without band and discipline/retrain in this area.
Monitor/audit to identify areas where patients consistently not banded.
Ask someone to arm band all patients.
Educate, competency; identification of technologist not understanding
results.
Monitor/audit to identify where errors are occurring and provide more
education. If problem is continues, let tech go.
Document reeducation efforts to prove lack of ability to retain information.
Make sure all results fit the clinical picture of initial diagnosis
Educate clerks to slow down
Monitor/audit to identify problem areas and then provide more education
in that area
Slow down and double-check before reporting
Educate employees on proper procedures

12

12

Clerical error

12

Incorrect results reported in
step 11 (see also no. 19)

(continues)
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Table 1
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS
AND CLERICAL STAFF (MOST CRITICAL) (Continued)
Hazard
Score

12

Error

Inappropriate treatment

Possible Action to Prevent
Monitor/audit to identify problem areas and then provide more education
in that area and after reeducation for the 3rd or 4th time employee needs
to be let go
Document the reeducation to prove lack of retraining information retained
Make sure all results fit a clinical picture and/or repeat results to verify
Educate/train/mentor provider
Monitor and audit problem areas to identify sources of errors
Remind providers that they need to listen closely to support staff
Ask patient to repeat treatment plan back to doctor in own words to verify
understanding and consent
Provide more laboratory to provider communication on pathology level (as
to what tests are important, why the testing protocol are in place, how
those results should be viewed in light of patient condition)
Reevaluate and reeducate providers to make them accountable

Abbreviations and definitions: Provider, physicians or physician assistants (PAs); nurses (RNs, etc), who are diagnosing and requesting/
ordering laboratory services; Tech, laboratory technologist (CLS/MT—generally 4-year degree) or laboratory technician (CLT/MLT—
generally 2-year degree).

a process of constant improvement. Information uncovered at each step (the FMEA process step 11) provides evidence for future areas of quality enhancement (the FMEA process step 12). Both DMAIC and
FMEA are iterative processes so management should
first develop a schedule of regular survey distributions to encourage constant evaluation and actions
that will further improve patient care and safety. A
second objective of the control plan is to provide
a monitoring system for the specific actions implemented earlier. These monitoring systems would include such traditional quality control tools as statistical process control charts, a visual longitudinal tracking system.

FINDINGS
Using the Delphi technique to conduct an FMEA
proved to be a very useful alternative methodology.
The technique allowed for a group of 15 process owners to share their inputs and knowledge to identify

both errors and actions to prevent those errors for the
purpose of improving patient safety and improving
the steps within the total testing process of their laboratory. Involving that many disparate process owners would have been impossible in this setting using
traditional FMEA methods.
On the contrary, there were some disadvantages
noted to this process. Requiring individual inputs did
create additional effort initially in that multiple instructions and much clearer instructions needed to
be provided up front by those administering the surveys. Also, because the surveys were often completed
away from the work setting, even though instruction
was provided, individuals did not always thoroughly
understand what knowledge and information they
were being asked to furnish. Without the leader being physically present to provide guidance, some responses were not correctly completed.
Finally, the synergistic advantages that can be
achieved in a well-designed brainstorming session
may have been missed. These team synergies are hard
to quantify but are, nonetheless, well-documented.
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Table 2
IMPROVE/IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Action

Responsible Person

Date to be
Method of Implementing Implemented

Audit to be
LTS and Laboratory
1) Audit wrist-banding Jointly between:
initiated
Manager will assign
Performance
for errors to
February 14,
laboratory staff to
Improvement
determine patterns
2011
perform unannounced
Clinical Evaluator
and root causes
random wristband
and LTS
checks on a daily basis
over the 2-week period.
March 1, 2011
LTS and laboratory
Jointly between:
2) Decision whether
manager will assign
Performance
enforcing the current
laboratory staff to
Improvement
policy (through
perform random
Clinical Evaluator
reeducation) is
unannounced
and LTS
sufficient or whether
wristband checks on a
the hospital needs to
weekly basis over the
develop new
following 1-month
policies.
period..

Control
(Evidence of Continued)
Implementation)
• Audit to be initiated for
2-weeks. During this
audit, deviations from
the current policy of
wrist-banding will be
noted.
• Audit regularly for
1-month. If no problems
exist at that time, spot
audits will be conducted
on a quarterly basis.
• If problems resurface, PI
and laboratory will
readdress and correct
and audit again in an
iterative cyclical
manner.

Abbreviation: LTS, Laboratory Technical Supervisor.

On the whole, however, it was felt that the advantages of uninhibited input from a larger number of
process owners outweighed the disadvantages of not
having the team synergy. The errors identified and
the number of quality suggestions generated by the
process, as completed, bears out that conclusion. It is
believed that, as additional Delphi-enabled FMEAs
are conducted at the organization, the better the process of instruction, education, and understanding of
both leaders and participants will become, overcoming many of the disadvantages observed.
One further finding was that, in the process of
conducting the Delphi technique surveys, which included open-ended questions as well, additional ancillary issues of interest arose. In a traditional FMEA
setting, facilitators usually attempt to limit tangential
discussions and issues to save time yet many of these
issues may be of at least equal importance on improving the processes and hence the patient safety. Using
the Delphi technique, limiting response and brain-

storming time is not as much of an issue so ancillary
ideas and suggestions do not get squelched. In the
course of this particular study, it was noted that the
existing policy in one particular area of phlebotomy
was actually too specific and should be revised to
be more generalized to make it both easier to follow,
more comprehensive, and more efficient.

MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
This new process for conducting an FMEA is of
importance to hospital administrators from the aspect that it will allow them to provide better, safer
care to patients in an easier and more efficient manner than employing traditional methods while at the
same time, meet their regulatory requirements set by
the JC. Performing FMEAs has often been problematic, at best. This methodology allows health care process improvement teams to conduct them in a more
efficient and broader manner with less disruption to
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the normal workflow processes of the system. It overcomes the 4 barriers mentioned earlier and provides a
formal, easily implemented structure for completing
a relatively complex analysis.

LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study did focus on an industry specific application, FMEA within the health care industry, and
was even specific to a particular set of processes
within one example of that industry, the total testing
process of a clinical laboratory. Although this may
limit its applicability to other processes within that
industry or to other industries, the approach appears
to lend itself to a wide range of areas. Future research
needs to be done in both of these arenas to confirm
this. In addition, longitudinal research needs to be
done to determine whether differences exist in the
long-term effectiveness of this approach versus more
traditional methods of performing FMEAs, perhaps
even side-by-side comparisons.
Future research will also include additional work
at the subject institution. Only one specific error
was addressed in the current implementation leaving 7 additional highly critical errors unaddressed.
Both the Performance Improvement Clinical Evaluator and LTS are interested in performing additional
root cause analysis and implementing additional preventative actions to further improve patient safety
and satisfaction. Their attitude is that JC requirements are merely a starting point from which to build
an ongoing continuous improvement program that
will enhance both the hospital’s ability to provide excellent health care solutions at reasonable costs and
keep the employees involved in improving their own
working environment and job satisfaction.

CONCLUSIONS
The hospital involved in this study does intend
to utilize the results of this research to satisfy its
quality improvement initiative requirements of the
Joint Commission. A copy of this study is on file
at the hospital in preparation for the next accreditation visit of the Joint Commission, which is currently

13

scheduled for the laboratory in the summer of 2012.
The JC certifies laboratories every 2 years and health
services every 39 months. As the accreditation visit
usually entails anywhere from 5 to 10 people over
2 to 3 days, the process is very thorough and this
study should provide excellent documentation of the
hospital’s process improvement efforts. The hospital
managers were very pleased with the ease of administration, the lack of disruption to the normal working
environment, and the honesty in answers and suggestions that the Delphi survey method provided to
them.
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APPENDIX
Table A
HAZARD SCORE TABLEa

[AQ7]
Severity

Frequent
Occasional
Uncommon
Remote

Catastrophic

Major

Moderate

Minor

16
12
8
4

12
9
6
3

8
6
4
2

4
3
2
1

a Adapted from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Avenue, NW—Washington, DC 20420. Reviewed/Updated Date:
November 10, 2009.

Table B
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND CLERICAL STAFF
Hazard
Score

Error

12

Critical value not reported,
lost report from floor to
provider

12

Nurse interprets report &
decides caregiver
notifications can wait.

Possible Action to Prevent
Be sure there is adequate staff and that they are paying attention.
Monitor/audit to identify where errors are occurring and provide more
education.
Document errors on employee file.
Call provider no matter what.
Call laboratory or just reprint if lost.
Provide a screen, similar to the laboratory, they cannot “WIZ” past and
emphasize how important this could be.
Educate the nurses that it is not nurse’s decision and that it is provider’s
responsibility to accept these calls.
Have a physician on call available from PM through A M (when doctors are in
office/floors) to be point of contact in case provider of patient unavailable.
Keep log of critical calls received and attempt communication with patient’s
provider.
Reassess policy for review.
Design a better “on-call” list for laboratory result notifications. For patient
type A: call X, for patient type B: call Y.
Have a better process established through quality control officer.
(continues)
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Table B
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND CLERICAL STAFF (Continued)
Hazard
Score

Error

12

Provider misunderstands
results or implications of
results- orders or fails to
order additional testing
and/ or procedures

12

Order wrong test

12

Phlebotomist drawing blood
from patient with no
wristband
Incorrect results reported in
step 10

12

12

Clerical error

12

Incorrect results reported in
step 11 (see also 19)

12

Inappropriate treatment

Possible Action to Prevent
Improve communication between pathologist, laboratory, and providers.
Provide continuing education as well as additional information or classes.
Have additional support available for consultation.
Schedule more frequent “Lunch & Learn” sessions between providers and the
pathologist (or pathology practice).
Provide education from laboratory pathologist on new tests or technology.
Educate providers that they need to call the laboratory for interpretation if
necessary.
Clarify ordering screens because it is sometimes hard to find right test for
choice on computer.
Have provider order tests directly into the computer.
Contact provider and get verbal verification if written orders are illegible.
Provide electronic order sheets.
Contact provider and question orders that do not make sense.
Do not draw without band and discipline/retrain in this area.
Monitor/audit to identify areas where patients consistently not banded.
Ask someone to arm band all patients.
Educate, competency; identification of technologist not understanding
results.
Monitor/audit to identify where errors are occurring and provide more
education. If problem is continues, let tech go.
Document reeducation efforts to prove lack of ability to retain information.
Make sure all results fit the clinical picture of initial diagnosis.
Educate clerks to slow down.
Monitor/audit to identify problem areas and then provide more education in
that area.
Slow down and double-check before reporting.
Educate employees on proper procedures.
Monitor/audit to identify problem areas and then provide more education in
that area and after reeducation for the 3rd or 4th time employee needs to be
let go.
Document the reeducation to prove lack of retraining information retained.
Make sure all results fit a clinical picture and/or repeat results to verify.
Educate/train/mentor provider.
Monitor and audit problem areas to identify sources of errors.
Remind providers that they need to listen closely to support staff.
Ask patient to repeat treatment plan back to doctor in own words to verify
understanding and consent.
Provide more laboratory to provider communication on pathology level (as to
what tests are important, why the testing protocol are in place, how those
results should be viewed in light of patient condition).
Reevaluate and reeducate providers to make them accountable.
(continues)
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Table B
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND CLERICAL STAFF (Continued)
Hazard
Score

Error

9

Not noticing an incongruent
result

9

Critical values not followed
up on or called to floor

9

Provider acts on tests only,
not whole clinical picture

9

Assessment error (incorrect
initial diagnosis)

9

Wrong patient identified

9

Inaccurate calibration, QC
errors

9

Test done incorrectly

Possible Action to Prevent
Provide adequate training or reeducate.
Train employees that turn-around time is not most important measure,
patient needs correct results more than timely inaccurate results;
Calm down and slow down.
Have a second party check result logs.
Go at a pace that allows you to follow procedures and ask for help when
needed.
Use competency exams to ensure techs understand/recognize incongruent
results.
Provide guidance as necessary.
Provide 2 people in the department on busy days.
Follow process and do not skip steps to save time.
Discipline and/or educate if do not follow up.
Monitor/audit to identify where errors are occurring and provide more
education.
Remind employees that pop-up on computer screen is supposed to make you
call.
Write-up errors in employees file.
Calm down and slow down.
Have a follow-up discussion with competency and observed practice.
Train employees so they understand and then remind and reinforce the
notion that a quick and inaccurate result is more harmful than a delayed
accurate result—quality not quantity.
Establish a responsible person to ensure provider’s capabilities.
Educate the provider on what test results mean.
Establish one provider who supervises all other providers
Less workload and involve other’s in decisions.
Educate providers (providers need to address).
Educational opportunities or consultation support (more continuing
education and competency assessments).
Provide opportunities for providers to destress (yoga, meditation, prayer)
Do not draw if you cannot identify.
Reeducate and reinforce policy to assure that employees follow protocol.
Provide reminder to staff that they will not be disciplined for refusing to
draw patients who have not been properly identified
Provide further education on calibrating and understanding quality control
results.
Review of calibrations done daily by lead technologist.
Work with manufacturer’s technical service if necessary.
Provide classes on quality control
Educate employees on proper procedures and that they must be followed.
Document the reeducation to prove lack of retaining information provided.
Provide competency tests in house to ensure same correct procedure being
used by everyone and that then observe procedure being used
(continues)
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Table B
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND CLERICAL STAFF (Continued)
Hazard
Score

Error

9

Instrument
error/malfunction

9

Skipping the report review
in step 10

8

Specimen not centrifuged
right. Others not mixed
before running

8

Bubbles in sample. Clots in
sample. Analyzer picks up
wrong volume

Possible Action to Prevent
Keep maintenance of instruments up to date.
Replace instrument if continually having problems.
Provide more time off the bench for lead techs by assigning calibration and
maintenance to competent evening staff.
Reeducate employees on maintenance.
Monitor instrument error logs, maintenance logs, and calibrations.
Review by a second tech in same day to make sure troubleshooting done.
Call manufacturer’s technical services.
Review maintenance policy.
Check of competency and additional education as needed combined with
observed practice with annual/quarterly evaluations;
Provide more familiarity with instruments.
Call over others as time permits to observe procedures when someone is
fixing equipment.
Develop a policy on what to do next if analyzer’s calibration fails.
Provide training so that all techs are familiar with calibrations;
Train employees better to pay attention;
Provide discipline when errors made.
Monitor and audit problem areas to identify sources of errors.
Educate staff to follow procedures.
Educate staff on how those results should be viewed in light of patient
condition
Slow down and do the process as the procedure calls for.
Pay attention (there are many disruptions in chemistry) and slow down.
Provide education or reeducation on mixing tubes.
Put up a reminder flag to check specimen integrity by the centrifuges and
analyzers.
Have the supplies needed to check for clots by the centrifuges/aspiration
stations centrifuged, mix, prep, sample, correct before running.
Do a “Stop, look, listen” and follow up with observed practice and
annual/quarterly assessments.
Inform everyone how each clinic’s tubes should be handled.
Check each sample before analyzing
Train employees and emphasize to them to follow the process.
Check all tubes in hematology for clots prior to being analyzed.
Place applicator stick by analyzer sampling areas to check containers that are
likely to have clots that will affect testing (example: microtainers).
Check the coagulation tubes for clots before centrifuging.
Check all EDTA tubes for clots if results are questionable.
Do a “Stop, look, listen” and follow up with observed practice and
annual/quarterly assessments.
Train employees so they understand and then remind and reinforce the
notion that a quick and inaccurate result is more harmful than a delayed
accurate result.
Check each sample before analyzing
(continues)
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Table B
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND CLERICAL STAFF (Continued)
Hazard
Score

Error

6

Laboratory not verbally
verifying patient
information in addition to
wristband.

6

Entering wrong patient ID
into computer

4

Interface problem

Possible Action to Prevent
Verify verbally and follow through with discipline if not done.
Assure appropriate audits are in place.
Have nurse or family members to also identify if patients are not able to
verbalize.
Leave note on employees record to reinforce policy if an employed found to
have not followed procedure.
Ask patients if employees have been verbally asking name and date of birth
(be sure patients know they can ask staff to verify.
Identify patients according to procedure and follow through with appropriate
disciplinary action when procedure not followed.
Inform & enforce current policy that states that all personnel will verify the
wristband information by asking the patient to spell/state their name and
give their date of birth if they are able.
Employees should always check patient information and file an incident
report if they do not.
Reemphasize the importance of verbal identification and policy with
employees
Hire enough staff so they are not overworked.
Train employees to slow down and stay focused.
Audit for patterns of mistakes.
Scanning barcodes if labels were placed on tubes at patients’ side.
Provide better education or reeducation on the hospital wide computer
system.
Double check all identification numbers entered/registered (use 2nd party to
verify if needed).
Finish each task at hand and double check before moving on.
Have other staff help in the process to lessen load of work or a particular
person/area.
Have 2 people in department on busy day (a laboratory “float”) so we have
enough staff to cover all areas so errors are less likely to occur.
Make the bar code number bigger.
Verify patient name after entering identification number
Improve IT’s part in the process.
An IT issue, enlist their help.
Complete the update of the new laboratory computer system coming to the
hospital as quickly as possible.
Try putting computers at the laboratory’s clinic/clients.
Identify issues early with walk-through of systems before being put into place
(continues)
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Table B
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND CLERICAL STAFF (Continued)
Hazard
Score

Error

3

Nurses not banding a
patient.

3

Reports printing to areas not
monitored (EMR or
printer).

Other Suggestions:

Possible Action to Prevent
Band all the patients at registration.
Confirm patient identification with nurse.
Track patients with no bands for first 3 days of each month (who, where,
when involved) to identify if random error or if attributable to a specific
department or person.
Provide appropriate disciplinary action.
Educate nurses on appropriate procedures.
Have a designated person to armband patients
Provide adequate staff.
Take nonmonitored printers out of system.
Monitor where reports are being sent.
Remove unnecessary printers so laboratory employees can not use from
hospital computer system.
Double check where laboratory’s reports are being printed; update list of
printers—verify numbers;
Check electronic record over printed record.
Have reports automatically print-take the human error out; automatic
printout to right area;
Continuing education within laboratory all the time is important.
Communication is major issue within laboratory and also with other
departments. Lack of respect for laboratory when there have been major
issues with certain employees and those issues are looked at by outside
departments of incompetence of laboratory in general.
Please do not ignore competency documentation. Limits need to be set on
how long problems can continue without severe consequences. Because of
ongoing issues with incompetent techs, we have lost respect from outside
of our department, which will never be gained back until we deal with
those employees. Ask the ER staff for direct feedback on this as comments
are received from them constantly.
Have departments do surveys of other department’s performances (ie,
emergency room vs laboratory, intensive care unit vs pharmacy). Discuss
the results at staff meeting. Do shadowing. Have a representative from one
department shadow another department staff member for a half to one full
shift to understand procedures undertaken in that department. For
example, an ER nurse that is shadowing a staff member in the laboratory
might understand why specimen integrity is so important and why some
tests are fast and others long.
Every department in the hospital must follow procedures. Write a procedure
if you need to. Educate and do competency testing. Use appropriate
disciplinary action when necessary.
(continues)
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Table B
POSSIBLE PREVENTION ACTIONS SUGGESTED BY LABORATORY EMPLOYEES, NURSES, ADMINISTRATORS,
AND CLERICAL STAFF (Continued)
Hazard
Score

Error

Possible Action to Prevent
A main problem is having a solid system of flow. Evaluation of “lean” like
processes to have in place. Increase focus of job, eliminate distractions, and
time management. Multitasking education, as well as time-management
education is highly needed. Addressing work problems (bench day & bench
work, not supervisory tasks).
Make 50 lashes with a wet noodle a mandatory punishment for all minor
offenses.
I believe communication from supervisors is the key. Who should be getting
specimens from clinic-enough staff to cover departments with fewer
interruptions (phone calls, leaving station to draw blood outside the
laboratory, going to get STATS from clinic & leaving chemistry unattended).
No one should fear asking a question or for help – our experiences are very
valuable and can be used to educate the laboratory staff.
There should be a better work flow in the laboratory, some techs, clerks
multitask while others can’t or won’t. All of the additional elements
(reviewing clinic orders, going to the clinic to get specimens, etc.) may need
to be more controlled regarding who does what.
To ensure good difference/change stain weekly-better yet automatic
differential staining-so all slides are good quality.

Abbreviations and definitions: Provider, physicians or physician assistants (PAs); nurses (RNs, etc), who are diagnosing and requesting/ordering laboratory services; Tech, laboratory technologist (CLS/MT—generally 4-year degree) or laboratory technician (CLT/MLT—
generally 2-year degree).
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